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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Situation and Purpose. In the 
year 1917 the period extending from March 12 through 
November 7 marks the only time in modern Russian history 
in which ~here existed the opportunity for the estab-
lishment of a democratic government. 
On March 12, the abdication of the Tsar, Nicholas 
II, ended a reign of autocratic rule which had extended 
unbroken, through successive monarchs, for centuries. 
Three days later the Russian Provisional Government was 
established for the purpose of (1) preparing for a Con-
stitueht Assembly, and (2) governing the country until 
the Assembly mete 1 
Due to the nature of the situation the Government 
was unable to make adequate preparation for the convoking 
of the Assembly, nor was it able to provide the effective 
temporary authority. After nearly eight months of 
trial the Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, 
and- a new authoritarian system was established. 
The reason for the failure of the Provisional 
Government is not easily defined for there were many 
1 F.A. Golder, Documents of Russian History 1914-
1917, P• 303. 
) 
factors involved. This was a period of great social, 
as well as political, change and the impact created by the 
clash of the old and new brought a social upheaval un-
paralleled in history. And, as if this was not enough to 
test the strength of the will to democracy, there were 
'\ 
still other confounding obstacles prese'nt. At the time 
the Russians were in their third year of war which so far 
had resulted in the loss of territory and an almost com-
pletely disorganized economy. This, together with the 
mistakes of the leaders themselves, contributed to the fail-
ure to prepare the groundwork for a democratic assembly 
upon whose decision the future Russian constitution and 
government would depend. 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an evalu-
ation of that situation. It is an attempt to show how 
the Provisional Government was unable to compete suc-
cessfully with the social forces that came into conflict, 
and also to show why the Government itself, was a major 
contributor to that failure. In doing so primary emphasis 
will be placed on the activities of the Government, the 
major influencing elements and their effect upon the 
Government, and the desree of success achieved by the 
Government in dealing with them. 
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The Organization or the thesis. The remainder 
of this introductory chapter will be devoted to, first, 
a few definitions and explanations of the important 
names and terms that will be encountered, and second, 
a brief historical survey of the events leading up to 
the formation of the Provisional Government on March 16, 
1917. 
The main body of the thesis will be divided into 
four chapters, each dealing with one of the four successive 
governments contained in the title Provisional Government. 
In each case the following elements will be considered: 
(1) the character of the government, (2) its program, and 
(3) those factors, both external and internal, whose ef-
fects were instrumental as obstacles to the attempt to carry 
out the program. 
In concluding, all significant elements will be 
considered in an attempt to specifically define the 
reasons for the failure of the Provisional Government. 
DEFINITIONS OF IMPORTANT TERMS USED 
For the purpose of acquainting the reader with 
those important parties and organizations which will be 
mentioned in the course of the development of this thesis 
3 
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I would f'irs·t like to give a f'ew brief' def'ini tions and 
explanations. 
Constitutional-Democrats. This party was founded 
in 1905.as "the f'irst of the Russian constitutional 
partiesn. 2 It was f'ormed as a result of' a split over the 
question of' policy in the older liberal Party of' the 
People's Freedom. The latter, with a program based upon 
a modified western Liberalism, had as its primary objective 
the alleviation of' the suff'ering of the Russian peasant. 
This was to be accomplished by working within the existing 
political framework. 
In 1905, however, many of the less moderate Lib-
erals became dissatisfied with this seemingly fruitless 
effort and turned to a policy of' demanding political 
ref'orm. It was believed that the establishement of' a gov-
ernment responsible to a basic law, as well as to the 
people, would provide a cure for all ills, not only those 
of' the peasant. These advocates of' a constitution split 
with the moderate Party of the People's Freedom and con-
tinued to advocate political ref'orm,calling themselves 
the Constitutional-Democrats. 
2 P.N. Miliukov, Russia, To-day and To-morrow, p.3. 
4 
In 1908 they received additional support from 
the ranks of the growing bourgeoisie class. Prior to this 
the industrialists had been content to rely on the Tsarist 
regime for their security. By favorable legislation and 
subsidy the infant Russian industries had been nurtured 
and protected. However, all this was changing for at 
this time the bourgeoisie began to turn away from Tsarist 
support. By 1908 the logic of economic self interest 
had begun to push the bourgeoisie in the direction of 
wider views, and to bring about an increasing disenchant-
ment with the T~arist regime.3 
In the Fourth Duma, in 1915-16, they joined with 
other moderate groups in the Progressive Bloc demanding 
the extension of political and civic liberties, a Duma 
that would be effective as a legislative organ,, and a 
check on the Tsar.4 They had little influence,and it 
led to the dissolution of the Duma in March 1917. 
3 Barrington-Moore Jr., Soviet Politics -The 
_:Qilemma of R<2..V!~' p. 23, 
4 The Duma, elected for the first time in 1906, 
had no power. It•s activities were only of a consultative 
nature. 
5 
After the March revolution the Cadets, so-called 
from the initials of the name, became the major party of 
the "right" because of the disappearance of the former 
supporters of the autocracy from the political scene. 
While more conservative groups did remain' , i. e., the 
Octobrists and the Center faction, they were small, and 
relied on the Cadets for leadership. 
The Cadet leader was Paul Miliukov, noted historian 
at the University of Moscow. 
Socialist-Revolutionaries. This party was origin-
ally a faction within the party of' the "Fighting Organi-
zation" which was formed in 1900 to agitate for the out-
right abolition of' private property. A split over the 
question of compensation for the landowners soon resulted 
in the formation of' the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or 
Essaires, as they were called. They adopted the West 
European brand of socialism and turned to the workers 
as the leaders of the Russian Socialist movement. 
Although at first a small group, the Essaires became 
the largest party after the March revolution as many who 
preferred a moderate form of' socialism flocked to their rank • 
They quickly gained control of' the newly formed Congress 
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of City Soviets, the city Duma in Petrograd and Moscow 
and, most important, the Petrograd Soviet. As leaders 
in the latter they had a great deal of influence in the 
course of events during the period of the Provisional 
Government. · 
The leaders of this party were V. Chernov and 
N. S. Chkheidze. 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. This party 
was founded in 1898 when George Plekhanov broke with the 
peasant party, the Narodniks, and adopted the West European 
brand of Marxist socialism. 
In 1903, at a party congress in Brussels., the party 
split into two factions over a question of organizational 
policy. The "softs.'.', led byMartov, advocated a loose re-
quirement for party membership while the "hards", lad by 
Lenin, insisted upon the requirement of actual and vigorous 
participation of members.5 At the time, the "hardsu held a 
temporary majority and were able to secure passage of their 
mro tion. 6 
5 I. Deutscher,/Stalin, p. 52. 
6 Ibid., p. 53.· 'The ballot was largely accidental. 
Some of the 'softer' delegates had left the Congress so that 
only two-thirds of the initial number of delegates cast 
their votes. Lenin's candidates were elected by a majority 
of two votes only (19 against 17, with 3 abstentions). 
Lenin insisted on the legitimate character of the ballot, 
as he was formally entitled to do. But the minority 
refused to accept defeat.' 
7 
From that time on the "hards" became known as the 
Bolsheviks (the majority),and the "sof'tsn became known 
as the Mensheviks (the minority). 
A loose union of' both factions was maintained until 
April, 1917& At that time Lenin returned to Petrograd f'rom 
his exile in Switzerland and denounced the moderate policy 
of' the Mensheviks. The latter had joined with the Social-
1st-Revolutionaries in the Petrograd Soviet and were sup-
porting the Liberal government in return f'or the liberty 
to organize the workers.? He also demanded the immediate 
seizure of' all property by the government, and that the 
power of' the government be transferred to tbe soviet.8 
The regrouped Bolsheviks broke away permanently f'rom 
the Mensheviks to become the extreme radical party. 
Throughout the period of' the Provisional Government 
the Mensheviks, f'irst in the Soviet, and later as members 
in the government continued their moderate policy. The 
Bolsheviks, insignificant at f'irst, gradually grew in 
strength as the weakness of' the Provisional Government 
became more evident. 
·7 Victor Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, 
p. 110. 
8 A. M~ Pankratova~., ttAprelskie tezisy Lenina", 
Historia ~' P• 145-146. V'ol. III 
8 
The leader:r of' the Menshevik group was H. Tseretelli 
while the Bolshevik leader was N. Lenin. 
The Petrograd Soviet. The Petrograd Soviet of' 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was f'ormed on March 13, 
1917 patterned on the 'workers councils' of' the abortive 
revolution in 1905. Originally its purpose had been to · 
provide f'or worker participation in f'actory af'f'airs. Now 
it was also to provide leadership f'or the ~ass of' workers, 
soldiers, and radical intelligentsia at home ahd abroad. 
The Soviet united most of' the Russian socialist 
elements into the largest political f'orce in the country, 
including all of' the soviets.~· which were being f'ormed in 
the large cities and towns, and in the armed f'orces. Of'-
f'icial unif'ication, under Petrograd leadership, occurred 
at the f'irst Congress of' Soviets in June. 
Soviets of' Peasants' Deputies were also f'ormed but 
they were not united with the wor<kers and soldiers un ti 1 
af'ter the Bolshevik revolution in Novembe~. 
The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Menshevik 
f'action of' the Social-Democrats were the two major groups in 
./ 
the Soviet. The Bolsheviks too were present but they.were 
content to f'ollow the Menshevik lead until Lenin's return 
in April. Af'ter April, however, the Bolsheviks, still 
9 
CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST COALITION GOVERNMENT 
Composition of the Government. On May 18, the 
Premier, Prince G. E. Lvov, officially notified the Tempor-
ary Committee of the State Duma of the composition of the 
new Provisional Government. It was as follows: 
Prince G. E. Lvov Premier and Minister of the Interior 
A. F. Kerensky Minister of War and Marine 
P. N. Pereverzev Minister of Justice 
M. I. Tereschenko Minister of Foreign Affairs 
N. V. Nekrasov Minister of Transportation 
A. I. Konovalov 
A. A. Manuilov 
A. I. Shingarev 
V. M. Chernov 
M. I. Skobelev 
I. G. Tseretelli 
Minister of Commerce and Industry 
Minister of Education 
Minister of Finance 
Minister of Agriculture 
Minister of Labor 
Minister of Post and Telegraph 
A. V. Peshekhonov Minister of Food 
Prince D. I. Shakhovskoi Minister of Social Welfare 
V. N. Lvov Ober-procurator of the Synod 
I. V. Godnev Comptroller 
In this new Government there were created four addit-
ional Ministries, those of Labor, Post and Telegraph, Food, 
and Social Welfare. The first three had formerly been in-
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In this new Government there were created four addit-
ional Ministries, those of Labor, Post and Telegraph, Food, 
and Social Welfare. The first three had formerly been in-
eluded as sub-departments within the Ministries o~ Commerce 
and Industry, Interior, and Agriculture, respectively, 
while the last named was an entirely new creation. Besides 
allowing more ~reedom o~ activity in their respective ~~ai 
the new additions also permitted the continuance· o~ a 
liberal-bourgeoisie majority even though ~ive more socialist 
were included. 
Tha creation o~ the Ministry of Social Wel~are,in: 
particular,was o~ some consequence in a~~ecting the chara-
cter o~ the Coalition Government. Up to this time social 
wel~are had taken a secondary position behind the more 
pressing political and econoll!ic problems. Now, due to the 
insistence of the socialists, and the ready acceptance by 
the liberals, both of whom. had formerly been active in the 
zemstvo movement, the ~irst e~~orts were made to include 
social wel~are as a responsibility of the Government, 
despite the existence of other problems. 
The purpose of the new Ministry o~ Social Wellare 
was to developt; and supervise charitable institutions deal-
ing with the protection o~ the poorer classes and establish 
menta dealing with public health.l Since the Ministry 
lacked suf~icient funds ~or the intended program, it was 
to operate primarily as a coordinating body ~or the act-
1 New York Times, May 21, 1917. 
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ivities of the zemstva units which were financed by popular 
subscription. The appcintment of Prince Shakhovskoi, 
current leader of the zemstvo movement, to this post was 
no doubt influenced by his proven ability as an administra-
tor: and fund raiser. 
While not too much was to be achieved at first, this 
pres~ntation of the idea of social welfare did result in 
two immediate, but temporary,beneficial returns for the new 
Government. In the first place it provided some reassurance 
for the broad mass of the people, and increased the con-
fidence in the central government. As has been seen, many 
looked upon the liberal-bourgeois Government with distrust. 
Secondly, it brought the upper middle class and upper class 
liberals into closer harmony with the socialists. This was 
due to the strong feeling by the liberals for humanitarian 
works, s.omething that was predominately characteristic of 
their years of effort in the zemstva.2 The fact that soc-
ialists, too, had worked,in the zemstva now provided a 
stronger basis for collaboration between them. These bene-
fits, however, were short-lived,and as soon as attention 
was turned to other matters they were all but canceled out. 
In this Cabinet the liberal-bourgeoisie again were 
in a majority,although this time it was greatly reduced. 
2 B. _?ares, A History of Russia, p. 402. 
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They had nine posts, a decrease or one, while the socialists 
held six, an increase or rive. The reason ror the continued 
socialist minority was due to the reluctance or the Soviet 
to completely indentiry itselr with the central government. 
They reared the alienation or those people whose moderate 
position allowed them to accept so rar the revolution and 
the democratic government.3 The Soviet was, no doubt, also 
restrained by the initial apathetic response or the public 
toward Lenin's revolutionary demand ror 1 all power to the 
soviet•. 
Of the six new men in the Cabinet five were socialists 
all noted for their agitation against the Tsarist autocracy. 
Four of the group, Pereverzev, Tserete-lli, Skobelev andc 
~eshekhon6v~..,Jhad each served a period or imprisonment or 
exile. Both Tseretelli and Skobelev were members of the 
Menshevik raction, and Pereverzev and Peshekhonov were 
7. 
Socialist-Revolutionaries. 
The fifth member of is new group, and the moot im-
portant one, was Victor Chernov. He was one of the round-
ers of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and Chairman of 
its Central Committee at this time. On the land question 
he ravored extensive agrarian reform, but as to the exact 
measures to be taken he maintained an ambiguous position, 
somewhere between the immediate seizure demands or the 
3 Izvestiia~ No. 56 May 16 1017 transtated and 
cited bv-F. A. Golde:r> ·n·nl".11mArd:~ ,;.,.-'R.;:;i:!~;anli~.,.+-,... ......... -·-:>!:', 
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Bolsheviks, and the moderate socialist's advocation of post-
ponement until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.4 
On the question of foreign policy, Chernov was vigor-
ous in his demands for a complete revision of the whole 
program, which he feared would continue on in the same un-
settled condition as had plagued the first Government.5 
He favored a continuatio~ of the war, but urged the repud-
iation of the Tsar's secret treaties with the Allies. 
Prince Shakhovskoi, the only new non-socialist in 
the Cabinet was, like Miliukov, one of the founders of the 
Constitutional~Demoer~tic Party, and had also been very 
active in the zemstvo movement. His inclusion represented 
the replacement for Miliukov as leader of the Cadet faction 
in the Government, and it was expected that he would take 
up where Mi~iukov left off, only this time in a less con-
spicuous post. 
As can be noted on page fifty-seven, the nine other 
ministers were those retained from the first Government, 
with all but one retaining the same posts. The exception 
was the transfer of Kerensky from the Ministry of Justice to 
that of War and Marine. This change is .very significant fer 
it is in this post that Kerensky achieves his rapid rise to 
prominence, soon after to succeed Lvov as Premier. 
4 A. F. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism, p. 308. 
---- -- ~~~~~; 
5 V. Chernov, Th~ Great Russian Revolution, p. 298. 
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Although, ~rom outward appearances, this new Cabinet 
composition did achieve the desired ef~ect, that o~ coali tio . ., 
it did not provide any relief to the internal divisions 
that had existed be~ore., and instead it actually increased 
In the liberal-bourgeois~~~: group, t:tlere still re-. 
mained the division between the Cadets and Octobrists., with 
Shakhovsko·i and Manuilov., respectively., taking up the leaderj 
ship le~t vacant by the resignations of Miliukov and Guchkov 
Furthermore, V. N. Lvov., o~ the Ce'fl:ter Party, still remained 
apart ~rom them as the representative o~ the interests o~ 
the landowners. Therefore,the strength in unity.that might 
have been achieved was never realized, as they continued 
to disagree on basic principles. 
To complicate matters still ~urther, additional 
divisions o~ opinion were introduced with the entrance o~ 
the new socialist ministers. For, where ~ormerly Kerensky 
alone o~~icially represented the soc.ialist position, there 
were now present a variety o~ socialist ideas the di~~erences 
o~ which were comparable to those among the liberal-bourg-
eoisie. 
A prime example o~ this is the divided opinion as to 
the best way of achieving socialism in Russia. Some 
socialists, like many in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, 
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put primary emphasis on the peasant as the natural leader 
in the process. They could trace this reliance on the pea-
sant as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century'; 
when the early socialists, led by Alexander Hartzen,put all 
faith in the immemorial bent of the peasant for socialism, 
as exemplified by the latter's work in mir.6 
Directly opposed to this, of course, was the Marxist 
ideology of the tiocial-Democrats: which placed all confid-
encE! in the leadership of the indu,strial worker. 
In the Coal~tion this division among the socialists 
~ 
was to manifest itself in the struggle between the two 
factions, with Chernov demanding the prompt consideration 
of the land reform question, and he being opposed by Skobelevi 
who insisted on the first consideration of labor interests. 
The socialist dilemma was 'further complicated by 
the new attitude of Kerensky who, where formerly an ad-
herent to the program of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, was 
now takin~ a more moderate positian in an attempt to provide 
a basis for agreement between the liberal-bourgeoisie and 
the socialists. 
Out of the fifteen members of the Cabinet there were 
6 While the mir did represent a communal element 
solely for peasants, especially crown peasants, it was not 
due to the efforts of the peasant that it existed, but 
rather it was imposed upon them·~~ by the nobility who did not 
wish to bother governing. After the reforms of 1861 the 
mir was used to retain the communal organization and so 
~dpt the peasant from owning a piece of land outright. 
See B. Pares 1 OJ>. cit.~ n. ~c;~. 
63 
only two, Kerensky and the Octobrist, Manuilov, who actually 
tried to establish a basis for compromise, but to no avail. 
Furthermore>there still existed the previous antago-. 
nism between the Government and tbe Soviet, only slightly 
ameliorated. Although the latter had more representation 
now, it was not in proportion to its strength, and the Soviet 
following remained distrustful of the liberal majority where 
political and economic questions were concerned. They 
intended to use their strength wherever possible to see that 
the Government 'carries out the program whole-heartedly.' 
Another fac~or affecting the Government and its com-
position was the increased activity.:of the Bolsheviks. 
Although it is not for a time yet that they have any direct 
influence, it is to be noted that the Bolsheviks were 
slowly increasing their strength through agitation within 
the Soviet and amo~ the workers. In the vote for coalitio~ 
they had been the major party in opposition, anq,even 
after the Government had been formed,they continued to 
demand transfer of all .power to the Soviet. This increased 
the distrust of the Soviet by the liberal-bourgeoisie. 
AS. .. will be seen in the course of this chapter, in 
July the Provisional Government first comes into direct 
conflict with the forces of the Bolsheviks, and although it 
temporarily checks them, it is not without serious consequ-
ence. 
On the whol~ the~ the composition of the Coalition 
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Government did not provide any promise of relief to the 
division that had split the first Government. Old ones 
remained, new ones were introduced. The failure to ~olve 
this problem was to be one important factor in the dev-
elopment of a second crisis. 
The Program of the Government. The policy proclama-
tion, issued~ on May 18, did not introduce a new program.? 
The program of March 16 remained as the fundamental guide 
for the Government, the only difference being the now 
evident emphasis on the ~ocialist interpretation of the 
'proper execution of its provisions. 
As a matter of' form all guarrantees. of civil and 
political liberties were reaffirmed. For other matters, 
tho·se requiring immediate consideration, only a general 
course of action was announced. In reference to the ec-
onomy the Government promised to fight the continued dis-
ruption by the extension of state control over the machinery 
of the economy. ,In this manner it was hoped that they 
would be .~ble to reorganize the finance system, giving 
beneficial results to both the employers and employees. 
But just how :far the Government would go remained to he 
determined. 
7 Riech, No. 105, May 19, 1917, translated by F. A. 
Golder,~· cit., P• 353-355. 
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The other points of the declaration were also charac-
terized by the lack of any specific definition of a course 
of action. In governmental affairs it was announced that 
the Government would continue "the work of introducing 
and strengthening the democratic organs of self-government/' 
and that every effort would be made to convoke the Constit-
uent Assembly as soon as possible. 
On the question of land reform, the difficulty was 
again temporarily avoided as they decided to continue the 
policy of waiting until the Constituent Assembly met, at 
which time the decision would be made. In the meanwhile, 
however, the Government would regulate the utilization of 
the land in the economic interests of the country. Ex-
actly what this meant was not clear. 
In foreign affairs the Coalition Government declared 
that it was for a " • • • general peace • •• without an-
nexations and indemnities ••• " , and would take, n ••• 
preliminary steps toward effecting an understanding with the 
Allies.n9 In the meantime the war effort would be maintaine • 
On the whole, then, it appeared that, as far as the 
new Government was concerned, the purely democratic approach 
as a method of solving the economic difficulties, was to be 
shelved in favor of increased regulation. In view of the 
8 Loc. cit. 
9 Loc. cit. 
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confusion which had accompanied the disruption of most 
aspects of the Russian societyit is almost surprising 
that the liberal-bourgeoisie, with the passive assent of 
the Soviet, expected that the situation would correct itself, 
guided only by the democratic ideals. By this time however, 
it was evident that stronger measures by the Government were 
needed if any progress was to be made. This was the intent-
ion of the socialist leaders when they agreed to enter into 
coalition. 
While this reasoning was well substantiated by the 
existing conditions, which required stringent measures, 
the Government defeated its purpose, and actually undermined 
its own position by the declaration of so vague a policy. 
After promising strict control of the economy it left the 
methods to be worked out between the opposing factions in 
the Cabinet. Furthermore there was no attempt made, other. 
than by an appeal to the peasants, to stop the destruction in 
the rural areas. In effect, then, the Government was going 
to compete on equal terms with the worker, manufacturer, 
landowner, and peasant in an effort to achieve a measure of 
control over the economy. As will be seen it could not be 
done. 
Domestically, the new Government first had to deal 
with the economic situation which was getting increasingly 
worse. The most serious problem was the shortage of food 
and resources for both civilian and military needs. Dur:.ing · 
this period the weakly food requirements of the armed 
forces alone was about eighteen million poodslO of grain, 
and at times the amount available fell below eight million. 
There was needed thi~ymillion ton of iron ore, but only 
three mill~on per week was the extent of production.ll In 
the woras. of the Minister of Finance, Shingarev, "Only a 
miracle can save the country from economic ruin.nl2 Un-
fortunately, the 'miracle' didn't materialize and during 
its existence the Coalition Government achieved very little. 
For the whole month of June, action by the Government 
was blocked from various quarters.. On May 27, Skobelev, 
Mil!llister of Labor, proposed that the state take over part of 
the metallurgical and mining industries in order to encour-
age closer relations between capital and labor, and there-
fore increase production. This was blocked by the Minister 
of Finance~ Shingarev, who held that the solution lay in 
the reduction of increased wage demands by the workers. 13 
As a compromise there was created a commission, con-
sisting :)f the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Industry, 
10 A pood is equivalent to about forty pounds. 
11 New York Times, May 31, 1917 .. 
12 Ibid, May 29, 1917. 
13 Loc. cit. 
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and Labor to investigate the demands of both the owners and 
workers in Petrograd and Moscow, and the Donets and Ural 
districts. It proved ineffective because of the continued 
division of opinion between Skobelev and Shingarev. The 
former, a Menshevik, was committed to support all demands by 
the workers, while· Shingarev, a Cadet, remained firm in 
defense of the of the bourgeoisie. 
The crux of the matter was the condition of real 
wages. The socialists claimed that wage increases were 
needed to offset· 13he rise in the cost of living; while 
the liberal-bourgeoisie maintained that prices would level 
off anly after the workers stopped demanding and, in many 
cases, forcing a raise in wages.l4 
The debate continued without any hope for compromise 
and conditions continued to worsen. Most of the workers, 
led by their factory soviets, gained wage ~ncreases, but 
the in.flationary spiral wiped out the advantages gained. 
In fact the value in real wages actually took a sharp drop. 
For the first half of 1917 it was calculated that seventy 
rubles in real wages was actually worth nineteen. In the 
second half, one hundred and thir~y-five rubles were worth 
only fourteen.l5 The worker,although almost doubling his 
wage~ had actually decr~ased his buying power by about 
. 14 V. Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p. 214. 
15 W. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, p. 265. 
one-third. 
On July 21, after the Cadets had resighed because or 
the disputed Ukrainian question, it was proposed that an 
economic council be set up to work out a plan for regulating 
the industrial economy. With the Cadets out, tha prospects 
ror unhampered action were improved. But before anything 
constructive could be achieved the Government became faced 
with another crisis, resulting in more resignations and 
ultimate breakdown. 
In agricultural matters also, the Govern.J]lent was 
unable to achieve very much. On June 15, Shingarev began 
work on a law to establish a state sugar monopoly. Ac-
cording to its provisions the Government was to establish 
the retail price, after purchasing it from the refineries, 
based on the whole cost of production.l6 As was to be ex-
pected, the socialists blocked this measure arguing that 
it would not reduce prices unless the cost of production 
was regulated also. The bourgeosie could not agree to this 
and sugar production continued at its low level,and prices 
continued to rise. 
As far as other food production was concerned the 
conditions were pretty much the same. Peshekhonov had 
contemplated a plan for a grain monopoly, but the failure 
of the sugar monopoly plan discouraged its introduction. 
16 New York Times, June 15, 1917. 
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He announced that he was postponing the plan '.! .••• due 
to the complicated organizational requirements •• fll7 
. ' 
and would continue to use the almost de~unct land committees 
in an erfort to work out something. As under the ~irst 
Government,action by the land committees was blocked by 
internal division plus the continued resistance by the peasm s. 
The peasants, during the last hal£ o~ May, ~or the 
most part continued their widespread acts o~ terror and 
destruction without paying much heed to the cessation 
appeals by the Government. There were man~ howeve~who 
indicated a willingness to stop the.waste~ul destruction, 
and turn to more legal means or achieving their objective. 
It is not clear whether this was due to the en-
couragement in seeing Chernov as Minister or J\,griculture, 
or else because o~ the wearying e£fects o~ the wild activi-
ties •. Most likely it was a little of each. But,at any rate, 
there were the £irst signs or abatement,and it remained 
~or Chernov to seize upon the opportupity to bring about 
some restoration o~ order. 
On May 21, Chernov stated that, as Minister or Agricu-
lture, he would continue to work on the preparation or the 
question o~ land re~orm for consideration by the Constituent 
Assembly, with the main principle in this preparation being 
17 Ibid, May 31, 1917. 
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that all land should go to the laboring people.l8 On June 
6, a strong appeal was made to the peasants to cease dis-
orders. In it, Chernov also announced that, u • • • all 
local land questions will be put into the hands of the 
organized inhabitants,"l9 i.e., the local zemstva and 
land committees. 
Although this was greeted enthusiastically by the 
All-Russian Congress of Peasants• Soviets, which promised to 
help the Government, it sti~l was not enough to satisfy all 
peasants, and in many areas they continued to ignore the 
appeals. Therfore, together with the already vast amount of 
destroyed food and farm implements, and the shortage of 
labor, the peasant revolt presented a major obstacle to any 
relief of the short food supply. 
Under this cdalition there was a slight improvement 
in domestic civil and political affairs, although many of 
the problems of the preceding period still remained. There 
was no difficulty over the question of civil liberties 
since all political groups were agreed on the desireability 
of the continuation of the previously extended rights. 
Furthermore, the earlier antagonism between the Gov-
ernment and the Sovie~, due to the latter's criticism 
18 Izvestiia, No. 61, May 22, 1917, translated and 
cited by F. A. Golder, QE• cit., p. 374• 
19 Riech No. 120, June 7, 1917, Ibid, P• 375. 
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through its journal, Izvestiia, was eliminated because o~ 
. 
the presence o~ the additional socialist ministers. In a 
complete about ~ace the Soviet now publicly offered ~ull 
support of the Government. 
The only instance in which a change in the Govern-
ment 1 s civil policy occurred was at the end o~ July· 
when, it was decided that the leaders of the Bolsheviks 
should be impr~soned for their leadership o~ a public 
demonstration against the Government. The only significant 
consequence of this action was that soon a~ter being jailed 
fhe Bolsheviks were released because o~ the lack of suf~ic-
ient evidence. 
The major signi~icant civil development during this 
period was the ~urther progress in separating the Church 
from the State. As was seen, the process had already been 
started by V. N. Lvov, as Ober-procurator in the first 
Government, and he again was given the post in order to 
complete the task •. 
In June, a Convention of the Orthodox Clergy and 
Laymen, friendly to the Government, convened in Moscow to 
work out and pass upon reforms. They requested special 
privileges for the Orthodox Church, especially, n . . . 
that their communion should retain the primacy among the 
religious bodies of Russia ••• "20 
20 M. Spinka, The Church~ the Russian Revolution, 
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The requests were turned down by the Government, and 
on June 20 two laws were passed which all but completed the 
process of separation. One law removed from tbe list of 
required subjects, in schools and military academies, the 
teaching of the Orthodox Catechism, and the second put all 
schools, supported from public funds, under the control of 
the Minis try of Edu.cation.21 The latter took from the Churc 
its former control of most of the public scho<llls. On July 
17, tbe separation was completed when the Government granted 
the right for individuals to pass from one church to another 
as well as to sever connections with any or a11.22 
To compensate for the radical change, and also to 
relieve itself of some minor duties, the Government assigned 
some civil functions to the Church. They were to register 
all births, provide the solemnization of marriages, and 
were authorized to grant divorces. This applied not only to 
the Orthodox Church, but in all others as well. 
In domestic political affairs, during this period, 
the Government was faced with more important problems. 
The question of the status of the State Duma came up, and 
the demands for complete independence by the Finns and 
Ukrainians, were again heard. Since the latter resulted 
21 Ibid., pp. ,76-77· 
22 Hitherto, non-confessionalism, or atheism, was 
not legally recognized. 
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in a Cabinet crisis it will be considered separately. 
In June, the question o£ the status of the State 
Du¢a was brought to attention. It had lost most o£ its 
legal significance since March, but now began to reassert 
itsel£. One Duma member, Moslenikov, recommended that it be 
convened in actual session to discuss the condition of the 
country, and then ofrer suggestions to the Government. This 
was not regarded seriously, and the matter was quickly 
dropped after the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 
meeting on June 22, proposed that the legislative authority 
o£ the Duma be legally abolished. 
The Government itself took a neutral posltion and 
announced that the question would be left to the Constituent 
Assembly. Concerning the latter, it also declared that 
elections would take place on.September 30. 
Although the Coalition had no great difficulty 
' 
with the civil and political problems already enumerated, 
and was fortunate enough,to·stave off complete collapse 
of the economy, it soon was faced with a crisis emanating 
from other quarters.· Besides the continued political div-
ision of its membership, this Government had to also contend 
with the failure of its 1 military offensive, and increased 
agitation by the Bolsheviks. These also contributed dir-
ectly t~ the failure of this first coalition Government. 
The major difficulty among the members o£ the Cabinet 
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apart f'rom the economic question, was due to 'the problem of' 
the national groups within the Russian boundaries, especial-
ly the Ukrainians. Since Poland and the Baltic states 
were still occupied by the Central Powers they were not 
involved, and there was no great dif'f'iculty in the case of' 
Finland although the Finnish Socialists still insisted 
that they be given more independence. 
On June 17, Kerensky, speaking f'or the Government 
announced~ 
We are warm def'enders of' the autonomy of' Finland 
and the Ukraine • • • but • • • until the meeting of' 
the Constituent Assembly, we have no right to declare 
the independence of' this orfuhat part of' Russian 
territory • • • 23 
While this served to quiet Finnish agitation a bit; 
it had the opposite ef'f'ect on the Ukrainians, and they 
increased their demands f'or a Ukrainian National Assembly, 
one that would legislate f'or all their domestic needs. 
At the same time, they proposed the immediate creation 
of' an All-Russian Parliament to which they would send 
representatives. The only concern of' these delegates, 
however, was to be in f'oreign and military af'f'airs, and 
omly.in so f'ar as they af'f'ected the Ukraine. 
On June 29, the Government issued an appeal to the 
Ukrainians not to act hastily, and to wait f'or the Consti-
23 Izvestiia, No. 85, June 20, 1917, translated and 
cited by F. A. Golder, op. cit., P• 367. 
tuent Assembly. There was no reply to this, and Kerensky, 
Tsaretelli, and Tereschenko were sent to Kiev to try to 
work out a compromise settlement. From these negotiations 
the Ukraine gained some small concessions; local authority 
in education and the courts, with all other matters le~t 
to the Provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly. 
Despite this, however, the Cadets voiced their opposition 
to the concessions claiming that all political decisions 
shdUld have been le~t to the Assembly, and that the action 
had, "•o• • put an end to the authority or the Provisional 
-" 
Government in the Ukraine. 1124 When, on Julyl6, the object-
ions o~ the Cadets were overruledtnhey disclaimed all 
responsibility and resigned. 25 
While the departure o~ the Cadets was serious it 
did not result in the resignation or the whole Government. 
This was due to the ract that the Government was, at the 
time,enjoying its first enthusiastic support by the people 
24 Riech, No. 154, July 17, 1917, translated and 
cited by F. A. Golder, Ibid., p.44o. 
25 Shingarev, ·Manuilov, and Shakhovskoi were those 
who resigned. 
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result of the tempgrary successes on the war front, and the 
remaining members saw no need for an immediate change. 
However, this optimism.was short lived as within a few weeks 
the Russian armies were stopped by the reinforced Austrians. 
The Russian offensive, which began on July 1, had 
been a result of the eonstant negotiation with the Allies 
since March concerning the conduct of the war. While Miliuko 
was Foreign Minister there had been no trouble because he 
had favored the honoring of the secret treaties, and had bee 
willing to follow the Allied lead. Once the coalition was 
formed, however, the policy was changed, and the new 
declared objective was that of bringing the war to an end 
as soon as possible in order to save Russia and the revoluti n. 
Unfortunately the Allies did not share this view, and they 
inslL.sted upon renewed military action. 
On June 5 it was reported that: 
It is und'erstood that the Russian Provisional Gov-
ernment has been warned that if she.accepbed a separate 
peace with the central Empires her action weuld be 26 almost equivalent to aligning herself with Germaay. 
This, plus the promise by the American President, Wilson, 
that a just peace would follow the conclusion of hostilities 
left the Government with no alternative but to support 
. 27 . 
another offensive. There was some consolation in the hope 
26 New York Times, June 6, 1917. 
27 Wilson's Message to Russia, June 9, 1917, cited 
by F. A. Golder, £E• cit., P• 343· 
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that it would serve to raise the moral~ of the troops. 
With the support of all but the extreme left wing, 
Kerensky, on July 1, issued the order to advance on the 
Galician front, and even went there himself to personally 
spur on the attack. The first weeks oC the offensive 
went well, and the Austrians retreated before the Russian 
armies. News of the successes was acclaimed by the people, 
and Kerensky was hailed at home and abroad as the new 
leader of Russia. Momentarily all differences and domestic 
difficulties became secondary as the fresh burst of 
patriotism swept the country. It was such that Kerensky 
was able to issue an order making disobedience in military 
ranks a criminal offense without any protest from the 
Soviet.28 
All this was changed on July 19 when the Austrian 
army, reinforced by German troops, stopped the Russian advan e 
and rapidly turned it into a complete rout. By July 22, 
telegra~ from the front told of the disaster, of demoralize 
troops deserting at the first shots of the enemy. Three 
days later the death penalty was restored, but it had 
little effect •. The offensive was a failure, and Russia 
was now worse orr than aver. Her military impotence 
was revealed and the Allies quickly became indifferent 
28 A. F. Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, 
p. 110. 
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toward her continued demands ror increased military aid. 
Furthermore, it revealed how weak the Government was, and 
the attacks rrom the extreme right and lert were increased. 
In Petrograd, on July 17, a mob of workers and 
soldiers w~s·: incited to riot by irresponsible radicals, and, 
with the Bolsheviks soon taking the lead, they demanded 
that all authority be turned over to the Soviet. For 
two days Petrograd was the scene or wild conrusion as 
armed bands of workers and soldiers attacked the loyal 
garrisons·~ There were everi .· attemptSliillltade to seize the 
Tauride Palace in order to arrest the members or the 
Cabinet. The disturbance was easily put down, however, 
ror the rioters could not gain the support or either 
the people or the Soviet. Most of the Bolshevik leaders 
were rounded up and imprisoned, but Lenin managed to 
escape to Finland. 
On July 20 the Soviet voted to continue in the 
Government and, now that the Cadets were gone, proposed the 
establishement of a democratic republic to replace the 
Provisional Government until the Constituent Assembly met .. 29 
This was accepted by the socialist ministers, but not by 
Prince Lvov who then resigned. Kerensky temporarily assumed 
29 Other proposals included the abolition or the 
State Duma, and increased control of the economy by the 
Government. 
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the pos"\:;. of Premier, and on August 2, all resigned f'or the 
formation of a new Government. 
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CHAPER IV 
THE SECOND COALITION GOVERNMENT 
The Character or the Government. On August 6, the 
composition or the new Government was announced as rollows: 
A. F. Kerensky Premier and Minister or War and Navy 
N. V. Nekrasov 
M. I. Tereschenko 
M. I. Skobelev 
A. V. Peshekhonov 
v. M. Chernov 
S. F. Oldenburg 
A. s. Azrudni 
I. N. Erremov 
P. P. Iurevev 
S. N. Prokopovich 
A. M. Nikitin 
F. F. Koloshkin 
A. V. Kartashev 
N. D. Avksentiev 
Deputy Premier and Minister or Finance 
Minister or Foreign Atrairs 
Minister or Labor 
Minister or Food 
Minister or Agriculture 
Minister or Education 
Minister or Justice 
Minister or Social Welrare 
Minister or Transportation 
Minister or Commerce and Industry 
Minister or Post and Telegraph 
State Comptroller 
Minister or Religion 
Minister or Interior 
The formation or the Second Coalition, like the 
rirst, saw the introduction or many new races, and a 
rurther shirt or the political balance or power to the lert. 
This time the socialists, on paper, held a majority or one, 
but it was not very signiricant since the division between 
• 
the two factions was not now as clear cut as had previously 
been the·ease •. ~is. had been the intention of Kerensky, 
who, after ~ceiving the approval of, all major parties as 
the successor to Prince Lvov, was allowed almost unrestrict-
ed authority in fu.e se.ilection of the rest of the Cabinet 
members.l He wanted a Government, whose members would not 
be dependent upon m.y party, ~he Soviet, or any other or-
ganization, but would be responsible, " ••• only to the 
country and their own conscience.tt2 Indication of how far 
he intended to go was seen in Kerensky•s declaration on 
August 5,- when he stated that: 
••• I, as head of the Government, find it necessary 
. to make changes in the order and in the division of 
·· labor of the Government so as to enable it to accomplish 
its task~ even if by so doing my responsibility is in-
creased • .J 
All parties and the two Soviets, those of Soldiers' and 
Workers' Deputi.es, and Peasants' Deputies, gave full support 
to the young leader.4 
1 This did not mean, however,, that the P,arties had 
given positive approval. It was the absence of disapproval 
that allowed Kerensky to choose his own men. Furthermore, 
pressure from the various parties did narrow the field of 
choice. See A. F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 254-255. 
2 Loc. eit. 
3 Riech, No. 171, August 5, 1917, translated and cite~ 
by F. A. Golder, Documents of Russian History, pp. 447-448. 
4 Kerensky was thirty-four at this time. 
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As a result oC Kerensky 1s choice the Cabinet was 
divided into three groups; seven socialists$ rive liberal-
bourgeoisie, and three claiming no ties to either rac:bion. 
His purpose WES to ach~eve a more evenly balanced Government 
Of the seven socialists four were Mensheviks, two 
were Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the seventh was an 
independent. In the Menshevik group, Skobelev and Peshek-
honov were carry-overs from the first coalition, retaining 
the same posts, and the new members were Prokopovich, and 
Nikitin. The two Socialist-Revolutionaries were Chernov, 
retaining the post of Minister of Agriculture, and 
Avksentiev, a new man. The lone independent was Kartashev, 
also a new man. 
Within this group there still remained the bitter 
ideological split over the merits of the worker, as opposed 
to the peasants, in leading the socialist revolution. 
Chernov, in his zealousness, even went so far as to declare 
himself opposed, in principle, to the establishment of this 
coalition, favoring instead the formation of a purely 
socialist government.5 He was not regarded seriously, howev& 1 
and at the most was expected to keep the socialists from any 
unified action. 
The group of five liberal-bourgeoisie was made up 
of the Cadets Oldenburg, Efremov, Iurenev, and Kokoshkin, 
5 Ibid., P• 256. 
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and the independent, Azrudni. All were new members, and 
they adhered to the Cadet pol~cy as set down by Miliukov. 
Iurenev and Kokoshkin were the most conservative, and they 
answered Chermov with the demand for an all-Cadet government 
This was also not regarded seriously. 
The third political grouping was a new phenomenon 
in the experience of the Prov~sional Government, for now 
Kerensky, Nekrasov, and Tereschenko disclaimed all political 
a.ffi,liations, and prepared to_ establish themselves as the 
balancing force between the socialists and the liberal-
bourgeoisie. Their purpose was to weld the whole Cabinet 
together for coneerted action. 6 
While this independent group first appeared at this 
time it must be remembered that its' development had actuall 
begun back in March. It was at that time that Kerensky, 
insisting upon socialist representation in the Government, 
disregarded the decision by the Sovietds Executive Committee 
ani accepted the post of Minister of Justice. And once in 
the Cabinet he was joinedppy the left wing Cadet, Nekrasov, 
who was having similar difficulties with the Cadet leaders.? 
In May both had iRsmsted upon the inclusion of additional 
socialists, and Nekrasov had even offered to relinquish 
his post as a gesture toward_ that end. Teresohenko became 
6 D.R. Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 
P• 143. 
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the third member of this group in July when, after the 
failure of the Galician offensive, and the crisis over the 
Ukrainian concessions, he came out in support of a coalition 
of this sort as the only means to the solution of the 
Russian problems. 
The task facing these three was to discourage the 
practice of long ministerial declarations, which had been 
used primarily by the. extreme party dogmatis'ts, and unite 
the new membership into a nonpartisan national government. 
In order to allow more freedom for this,Kerensky appointed 
B. V. Savinkov and Lieutenant V. I. Lebedev as Assistant 
Ministers of War and Mar~ne to handle that Ministry under 
him, and Nekrasov· appointed M. Glasberg Assistant Minister 
of Finance, and the University of Moscow Professor, M. V. 
Bernatsky, director of the department. This permitted their 
almost constant devotion to the job of reconciling 
differences in the Cabinet. 
On the whole it might be said, with some justificat~ 
ion, that this appeared to be the strongest Provisional 
Government .of the three formed so far. It had the active 
support of /all bp:t three of its' membership, and even 
they were willing to go along with the rest. It was freer 
from outside influence in that, of all its' members, only 
two remained active as leaders of an outside organization. 
They were Chernov and Skobelev who continued as members of 
the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. 
86 
Furthermore, Kerensky, at first had the support of 
all the Parties for his plan to apply strong measures as 
a means of easing the economic and military difficulties. 
And finally, there was no immediate trouble expec'ted from 
the Bolsheviks since they had discredited themselves in the 
July riots, and many were now in jail. 
All in all, judging from its' composit:Lon·, the 
outlook for the Second Coalibion on the frrst day of its' 
existence looked pretty good. It remained to be seen just 
how successful it would be in dealing with the problems. 
The Program of the Government. Unlike the previous 
announcements of the formation of a new Government this one 
was not accompanied by the declaration oi.' a specific 
program. The only statement made at that time was the 
general declaration of intentions made l?Y Kerensky on 
Aug~st 4o In it he announced that: 
Having been in the Provisional Government from the 
moment when the people took over full power, I regard 
it as necessary , •• to hold close to the principles 
which it has wor~ed out, developed, and embodied in 
its declaration. · 
This general statement was all that was permissable 
at the time since Kerensky was bound by a prior agreement 
to· call a c<;>nference.in Moscow for the purpose of getting 
the ne·cessary, " ••• consent and backing of all honest 
8 Riech, No. 171, August 5, 1917, translated and 
cited by F. A. Golder, ££• cit., p. 478. 
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and loyal elements in the country."9 This decision had been 
made during the ifuly crisis when, after Prince Lvov 1 s 
resignation, the Government'$ position of authority had 
been visibly shaken. Kerensky, with his new coalition, now 
saw no need for it,lO but in spite of this he was forced by 
the liberal-bourgeoisfue to wait until the conference met 
before issuing a definite policy statement.n 
During the interim period, marked by a reconsolidati n 
of the various parties into the two major groups, the 
attempts by the Government to check the continued worsening 
conditions proved fruitless. In economic matters the high-
light of the period was Nekrasov 1 s proposal, on August 10, 
for the creation of state monopolies as a means of promot-
ing a system of public and private industrial and commercial 
development.l2 However, long discussions and debates 
prohibited it from progressing beyond the proposal stage. 
The same was true for all other proposals since neither 
side wished to concede anything Q,efore the Moscow Conference 
As a result there was no relief for the economic distress.l3 
9 Izvestiia, No. 116, July?6, 1917, ~., p. 482. 
10 A. F. Kerensky, The Catastrope, p. 279. 
11 The various socialist parties had alao dismissed 
the need for a State Conference. See F.A. Golder, .2.12• cit., 
.l..l ..p' .· .. · 485-.- . ' . '· -. - -.- - .. 
:, - -·. '-· ·~ . ' . :, .. 
12 New York Times, August 11, 1917. 
13 W. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, p. 264. 
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~n military affairs the picture was about the same 
as before. Following the failure of the Offensive, a new 
commander, General Kornilov, had been placed at the head of 
the armies. He ~s unofficially given authority to restore 
the old time ·military discipline, despite the system of 
military soviets wh!i.ch continued to exist. But this proved 
to be too late fer by now demoralization had affected almost 
the whole army, and desertions and revolts in the ranks in-
creased by the week. In fact, for the first weeks after 
his appointment, Kornilov had to devote much time in re-
cruiting new men from those rural areas which had not yet 
been affected by tre revolutionary spirit. 
While Kornilov proved unsuccessful in restoring the 
army~ it will.be seen that another consequence of his ap-
pointment was.,to present the Government with another crisis, 
the ·first signs of which appeared at the Moscow Conference. 
On August 26, :m.o~e ,.,than twenty-five hundred delegates 
assembled for the Conference at Moscqw. In the gathering 
there were included representatives of about every political 
opinion in Russia, including the former supporters of the 
Tsar. Actually, though, this was more than a conference'. 
It was a test of strength, with the bou~geoisie on the of~ 
fensive and the socialists on the defensive.l4 This was so 
14 A hand~c~p to the socialists was the fact that 
:i:nore than half o:f~ the delegates were by education, tradition 
and business conm ction opposed to socialistic programs. 
because, after the misfortunes in July, public opinion had 
swune tow~d the Right, permitting the former nobility to 
reappear on the public scene, and also resulting'in an 
increased criticism of the Soviet. 
Preliminary to the formal opening of the Conference 
the various dale&ates formed two groups, and each put for-
ward a champion; ttThe Socialists cheered for Kerensky, the 
bourgeoisie hailed Kornilov. 1115 Kerensky, however, tried to 
maintain a neutral position during the whole aff~ir. 
During the course of the Conference the positions 
of each group ware publicly announced.16 Chkhaidza, 
representing the official Soviet opinion, advocated strict 
measures by the Government, including the use of' state 
monopolies to ease the economic situation, the establishment 
of a definite procedure by which the local land committees 
could solve the land problem, the organization of an effect-
iva system.of local self-government, ~d a strengthening of 
the army without the abolition of the army soviets. 
On the other side, the liberal-bourgeoisie, plus the 
more conservative delegates, put primary emphasis on the app 
eal to national unity as a means to the solution of the 
problems. 
15 F. A. Golder, op. cit., p. 480. 
16 ~., pp. 484-511. 
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The Goverr:u:nen t should immedia·tely and defmi tely 
put an end to the utopianism which has proved so 
ruinous in its work ••• a let us leave it to the 
Constituent Assembly tG lay down the.fundamental 
prin~iples of the Russian State and bring about the 
desired reforms.l7 
The climax of the Conference was reached on August 
28 when General Kornilov appeared and demanded unlimited 
authority for the rebuilding of the armies. He received a 
huge ovation from the liberal-bourgeoisie-conservative 
bloc, but soon after, the latter, once again realizing 
that the socialist minority did actually represent a greater 
strength than theirs, calmed down enough so that an agreemen 
for adjournment could be reached. In the same afternoon 
Kerensky brought the Conference to a close with the 
statement that, although vague, provided the only basis for 
agreement between the opposing groups. He declared that 
from that day forward he would govern the country with a 
strong hand. 18 Nothing more could be said, and both groups, 
except for their extremists, went away thinking that they 
had been successful. 
While it seemed that the Moscow Conference 
had achieved something constructive in giliving unified 
support to Kerensky's advocation for a strong government, 
17 Riech, No. 190, August 28, 1917, cited by F. A. 
Golder, Ibid., p. 485. 
18 Izvestiia, No. 145, August 29, 1917, Ibid., P• 50 • 
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it is to be seen that the unity was weak,and only temporary, 
and that within a raw weeks it was broken in the crisis 
growing out or the eonrlict between Kornilov and Kerensky •. 
In the words or the latter, "The Moscow Conference became 
the prologue to a terrible drama which developed • • • .. if-19 
It is not entirely clear how the incident came about 
either Kornfulov wanted to establish himselr as a dictator, 
or else both he and Kerensky had rirst agreed· to share the 
power and arterwards split over the details or the division. 
So far I have not round adequate evidence to rully sub-
stantiate either, but it seems that the fDrmer is the most 
probable. 
As was already pointed out Kornilov had been granted 
a wide range or authority in rebuilding the army. This, 
however, fell short of the authority he desired.20 Kerensky 
still insisted upon the final authority in all military 
arfairs, and the continued existence of the army soviets. 
Neither one would concedej aad the uncertainty continued 
until September 8 when the crisis occurred. 
It is der·ini tely established that on that date, V. N 
Lvov, the former Ober-procurator or the Holy Synod, com-
19 A.Ft~, ;Kerensk-Y; The Catastrophe, p. 286. 
2° Kornilov wanted complete control or the army, 
both at the front and in the rear. See F. A. Golder, £P• 
-c{t p· n7 "·· .... ,_ 
..a.. .• , • ;J.J-.... ' ·-· -.. ~-:·. 
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municated with both Kerensky and Kornilov, giving each an 
ultimatum from the other. Who he actually represented is 
not known. 21 
Ill 
At any rate the damage was done, and Kornilov 
made an appeal to the people asking for their support in the 
formation of a new government. 
On September 10, Kornilov despatched two regiments 
from his headquarters at Mohilev,ordering them to take over 
the Government. In Petrograd Kerensky appealed to the 
populace to arm for the defense of the city. But before 
the former's tropps got to Petrograd they were persuaded by 
rep:vesentatives of the army soviets to give up the react-
ionary cause. The success of the latter prevented the attac , 
stopped the revolt,- and Ke~Ib.dd:e~ was relieved of his 
command. 
As a result of this public opinion swung back to 
the left. The Soviet accused the Cadet ministers of 
implication in the plot, and aaked that they leave the 
Cabinet, insisting that a coalition was no longer possible. 
Kerensky argued against this, and a compromise was reached. 
It was agreed that, for the time being, all ministers would 
remain at their posta as directors of their departments, 
and that a make-shift government of five would be formed. 
This was done on September 14, when the "Directory of Five" 
was created. It consisted of Premier Kerensky; Minister of 
21 D. R. Francis, ££• cit., p. 157. 
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Foreign Arrairs, Tereschenko; Minister of War, General 
Verkhovsky, Minister or Marine Rear Admiral Verderevsky, 
and Minis~r of Post and Telegraph Nikitin. Its' objective 
was to try t0 restore order in the country, and to reorg-
anize the ar.my.22 But ror the three weeks that rollowed, the 
distrust between the contending ractions prevented any actio • 
The most impontaat consequence or the Kornilov 
revolt was not the Cabinet crisis, but the swing of public 
opinion to the left. Not only was the prestige of the 
Government lowered, it also had an errect upon the Soviet 
ror now the socialist rollowing began to lis iBn to the 
appeals by the Bolsheviks, and many began to join their rank , 
The latter was now led by teon i'rotsky who had beenacquited 
or charges of treason ror his part in the July uprising. 
He had formed the Red Guards when Kerensky had appealed to 
the populace to ar.m, 23 amd arterwards refused to disband 
them. Their presence gave support to the increased 
agitation permitting the Bolsheviks to gain adherents in th 
various soviets, even in Petrograd itselr. 
On September 27, a Democratic Conrerence was held 
in Petrograd ror the purpose or deciding on the formation 
of a new government. It was to be similar to the one held i 
Moscow, but this time it was called by the Soviet which 
F. A. 
22 Izvestiia, No. 161, September 16, 1917, cited by 
Golder, QE~ cit., p. 539· 
23 See • 
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intended to have the majority, and its own way. All polit-
ical groups were invited, but the liberal-bourgeoisie 
refused to attend. Therefore the result was a bitter 
debate between the Bolsheviks and the moderate socialists 
over the question or the character or the new government. 
The Bolsheviks opposed any coalition while the moderates 
said they would permit one, but would not give it full 
support. 24 Although the latter won out by a vote of 766 to 
688 the narrow margin showed how strong the Bolsheviks 
had gotten in this short period. 
On October 4 the Conference reported the results 
to Kerensky who in turn invited the liberal-bourgeoisie 
into a new coalition. After much discussion an agreement 
was reached, and,on October 7, Kerensky dissolved the 
"Directory or Five" and formed the Third Coalition. 
24 F. A. Golder, ££• cit., PP• 547-555. 
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GHAPTER V 
THE THIRD COALITION GOVERNMENT 
The Character of the Government~ On October 8, the 
Third Coalition Government, the fourth Provisional Govern~ 
ment, was formed. It consisted of the following men. 
A. F. Kerensky Premier 
A. I. Verkhovsky Minister of War 
D. V. Verderevsky 
A. M. Nikitin 
M. I. Tereschenko 
S. N. Prokopovich 
M. V. Bernatsky 
S. S. Salazkin 
A. V. Liverovsky 
A. I. Konovalov 
N. M. Kishkin 
s. A. Smirnov 
A. V. Kartashev 
Minister of Marine 
Minister of Interior, Post and Telegraph 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Food 
Minister or Finance 
Minister of Education 
Minister or Transportation 
Minister or Commerce and Industry 
.Minister of Social Welfare 
Comptroller 
Minister of Religion 
P. N. Maliantovich Minister of Justice 
K. A. Gvozdev 
S .: L. Maslov 
S. N. Tretiakov 
Minister of Labor 
Minister of Agriculture 
Chairman or the Economic Council 
The composition of this Government in many respects 
appeared similar to its' predecessor in that its' formation 
depended almost solely upon the errprts or Kerensky~ it was 
a coalition,. and,as berore,there existed a group or 
'neutrals' who sought to maintain themselves as the balan-
cing group between the opposing elements. Accordingly, it 
might have been expected that this ~overnment would have 
had more success than its 1 predecessor, depending or course 
upon the rreedom rrom such unexpected dirriculties like 
that or the Kornilov arrair. However, these similarities 
were only sumerricial, and beneath them existed the almost 
unreconcilable reeling of distrust that had grown out or 
the September revolt. This had a great errect on the 
rormation of the (}overnment. 
In the first place, although Kerensky was again 
responsible ror the rormation or the coalition it was under 
dirf'erent conditions that he was able to bring it about. 
On August 6, he had enjoyed the rull support or all major 
Parties, but this time it was almost the reverse. To show 
the extent of the division between the ractions, and the 
difriculties encountered by Kerensky, it is necessary 
to go back to September 27, and examine in detail the events 
leading up to the rormation of this government. 
On the socialist side the issue was debated at the 
Democratic Conference held in Petrograd rrom September 27 
to October 4· As has already been pointed out the Conferenc 
had been called by the Soviet for the purpose of' providing, 
" ••• the decisive word on the ror.mation of' a strong 
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government •• • ,~1 and,unlike tbB Moscow Conference, they 
had intended to have the majority. Because of the absence 
o:f any liberal-bourgeoisie representation, however, the 
socialist~ divided into two major groups, one following the 
leadership of the moderates, and the other fGllowing the 
Bolsheviks.2 And all debate centered around the question 
of coalition. 
Almost all were opposed to a coalition like that 
experienced, but many were not opposed to coalition in 
principle. The moderates maintained that so long as_the 
liberal-bourgeoisie could be restrained from obstructionist 
tactics they would not oppose their participation. The 
opposition to this came from the Bolsheviks who continued 
their demands for the transfer of all power to the Soviet. 
For a short while the opposition of the Bolsheviks 
was successful, and the heated debate prevented any action. 
On October 2, amid great confusion, the Conference voted :for 
coalition in general, voted against coalition with the Cadet , 
and then on the motion as a whole voted 813 to 183 against 
coalition.3 During a brief adjournment to clear up the mess, 
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. 1 Izvestiia, No. 161, September 16, 1917, translated 
and cited by F. A. Golder, Documents of Russian History, p. ~42. 
2 The Bolsheviks had increased their following among 
the workers, and now also provided leadership for the 
anarchistic Maximalists, and the Left Socialist-Revolution-
aries. 
3 ~ ~ Times, October 4, 1917 
the Bolsheviks, seeing that they were losing ground, lert 
the Conference. 
On October 4, it-was resolved that a coalition be 
formed in which the socialist element would predominate. 
It was also resolved that a new organ, the Provisional 
Council of the Republic~ be set up. It would be composed 
of members chosen by the Conference, and would hold the 
Ministers responsible for .their actions.4 
Kerensky accepted the proposals, but insisted that 
the membership of the Council also include the liberal-
bourgeoisie. This was ag~eed to by the socialist leaders. 
During this same period the liberal-bourgeoisie 
remained in Moscow. There the Cadet leaders, together 
with the business, banking, and manufacturing interests, 
put forward their proposal~ for a basis upon which a 
new government could be formed. They were in favor of a 
coalition, preferably one in which they would have much 
power, but insisted that it be absolutely independent of 
ali~ political organizations.5 For this reason they 
refused to be held responsible to the Provisional Council 
as proposed by the Democratic Conference. 
4 F. A. Golder, E.E• cit., p. 541 •. 
5 New York Times, October 1, 1952. 
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Kerensky, after a week of discussion with both 
groups, brought the respective representatives together 
for dis-cussion, and a compromise was agreed upon. The 
socialists conceded that the Council should at first have 
only an advisory function, but only on the condition that 
it be given more power if it proved to be strong.6 Then 
both agreed on liberal-bburgeoisfue participation in the 
Council, and Kerensky began his selection of the members 
of the new coalition. 
It can be seen then that Kerensky was faced with 
a great task in trying to bring the two factions together. 
That he succeeded is indicative of how influential a 
personality he actually was. This should not be under-
estimated as an important factor for,in all liklihood, 
without his efforts there would not have been a coalition. 
As described by correspondent Harold Wilson,_ 11 ••• there 
is no other man in Russia at this moment who can take his 
place. . . 
In regard to the actual selection of the members 
of the Cabinet the divisions between the various groups 
was again an important factor. The Soviet insisted 
upon a socialist majority, and.Kerensky had to oblige 
them by appointang eight socialists, as against 
five liberal.::.bourgeoisie. However, he sought to weaken 
6 F. A. Golder, 2£• cit., P• 557• 
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the possibility~of' comple~e :socialist domination by includ-
ing socialists of varying opinions, and also by the inclusio~ 
of a group of 'neutrals' headed by himself. 
In the socialist group were the Social-Democrats, 
Nikitin, Prokopovich, Maliantovich, and Gvozdev; the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries, Liverovsky and Maslov; the 
Radical-Democrat, Bernatsky; and the independent, Salazkin. 
As was the case in the two previous governments, the ideo-
logical difference between the two major parties still 
existed. 
In his choice of the liberal-bourgeois members , 
Kerensky also included men of varying views. Both Konovolov· 
and Kishkin represented the left wing of the Cadet party. 
This was balanced by tha more conservative Smirnov and the 
independent1 Tretiakov. Included also was Kartashev who, in 
the previous Government, had shown himself as a moderate 
liberal. 
To maintain am effective group of 'neutrals' Kerensky 
created separate ministerial posts for War and Marine, and 
gave Verkhovsky and Verderevsky, respee·tively, full min-
isterial status. Both were socialists, but claimed :m.o 
party ties, and they could be counted on to support Kerensky s 
actien if it proved necessary to balance one group against 
the other. Tereschenko, an independent, was also included 
because of his earlier union with Kerensky on this question. 
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A significant change in the CoalitiQn 1 s composition 
was the exclusion of all prominent party leaders. This 
was due to the pressure of the liberal-bourgeoisie for an 
. 
independent cabinet, and also because of the desire by 
Kerensky to have a freer hand in formulating governmental 
policy. However, the party leaders continued their verbal 
battle on the outside, and, while not able to directly 
influence the formulation of official policy, did engineer 
the obstacles to its' execution. 
The Third Coalition Government, therefore, while 
appearing to be as s t·rong as its_ predecessor actually 
turned out weaker. The Kornilov episode had split the 
coalition question wide open, and the resulting suspicion 
and distrust was to prove to be a major factor in its' 
failure. 
The Program of the Government. Accompanying the an-
nouncement of the formation of the Third Coalition Govern-
ment was its' declaration of policy. In essence it was no 
different than those fundamental principles laid down in 
March, and reaffirmed by each succeeding Government. The 
only change was in the attitude of the new Government con-
cerning the probable course of action. As announced by 
Kerensky, stronger measures would be taken to counter the, 
Kerensky, a:fter a week o:f 
discussion with both 
groups, brought the 
respective representativ t 
:for dis.cussion, and as ogether 
a compromise was 
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"Waves of anarchy that are sweeping over the land • • • • n 
To meet the eco~omic difficulties Kerensky declared 
that the Government would supervise all aspects of the 
economy, especially those related to production, labor, and 
finance. And that all necessary steps would be taken to 
,. 
increase industrial ·and agricultural production, regulate 
the relations of the workers and empl9yers, and reorganize 
the system of taxation.9 
Concerning foreign and military affairs it was 
declared that the war effort would be continued until a 
universal peace could be achieved.10 It was also announced 
that an interallied conference would be held in the near 
future at whieh time the Provisional Government 1 s represent .... 
abives would try to come to an understanding with the Allies 
on the question of a general peace, and also ask for addit-
ional material aid. In the meantime the army, now in the 
process of reorganization, would defend as best it could 
against the Germans. 
In such civil matters as those concerning local self 
government and the nationalities it was stated that, while 
all final decisions would be left to the Constituent Assem-
8 Izvestiia, No. 182, October 10, 1917, translated 
and cited by F. A. Golder, QE• cit., p. 558-563. 
9 Prior to this there had been no taxation on s 
profits, luxuries, or property. See F. A. Golder, Loc .• cit. 
10 L oc. eit. 
--
103 
bly, now postponed until December, the Government would in 
the meanwhile take some measures ·to f'urther developti a dem-
oeratic system of' local self'-gover~nt, and also give a 
greater degree of' aunonomy to the nationalities. This 
action was justif'ied on the grounds that it would f'acilitate 
the work of' the Constituent Assembly, and also gain addit-
ional support f'or the Government in its' task of' economic 
reconstruction and military reorganization.ll 
On the whole, this program, like the preceding ones, 
held promise of' relief' f'or the country, if' carried through. 
All groups recognized the need f'or strong governmental 
measures, and all but the extreme right and lef't were will 
to let Kerensky direct their execution. The major dif'f'icul 
however, was that the Premier never did achieve the 
necessary f'reedom of' action because on each point of' the 
program either the liberal-bourgeoisie or the socialists 
withheld their f'ull support. This was due to the f'ear by 
both that the other 'group might gain the most inf'luence 
. 
in the execution of' the program. Furthermore, the growth 
strength of'the ext~eme elements in the opposing !'actions, 
and their increased agitation, f'urther accentuated the dif'f'-
erences. The result of' all this was that, both inside and 
outside the Cabinet, the suspicion and distrust pushed the 
11 Loc. cit. 
, 
--~--
socialists and the liberal-bourgeoisie farther apart, and 
all but eliminated the Provisional Governmentts chances for 
success. 
As far as attempting to carry out the progra~ was 
concerned, there was little that could be done, and the 
Government was ineffective in trying to deal with the three 
major problems that arose during this period. These were 
the complete collapse of the army, the worsening economic 
situation, and the successful uprising by the Bolshevik-led 
extremist group. The inability to check the first two 
paved the way for the occurrence of the third. 
By this time the condinion of the armed forces 
was at its worst. It represented the culmination of the 
process of disintegration which, to be sure, had begun prior 
to March,l917, but which had been given impetus, in succes-
sive stages, by the Petrograd Soviet r a n·Or¢ler Number One", 
the failure of the July offensive, and the Kornilov revolt. 
Every day the number of desertions increased by more than 
a hundred, and many of those remaining at the front stopped 
fighting and fraternized with the Germans. Besides this, 
many reserve units in the rear now refused to go to the 
front. 12 In short, the situation was such that a large 
12 New York Times, October 8,to November 4, 1917. 
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number of the Russian soldi.e·rs in the front lines held 
themselves responsible to no one save those officers selecte 
according to the new democratic committee system, and even 
they lacked power to enforce their commands. 
In this situation, the Government was at a complete 
los~ as to an adequate course of action. Kerensky, on 
October 23, appealed to the Provisional Council for help, 
but all they could do was to appoint a Council of Def'ense 
with the instructions to try to ra:tse the morale of the 
soldiers by use of propaganda. Even Ke'rensky, Verkhovsky, afd 
Verderevsky want to the f'ront lines to p.ersonally appeal 
to the troops, but it had no ef'f'ect, and the dif'ficul ties 
continued. To m~e .matters worse the Germans had taken the 
of'f'ensive on the nCll:' thern front, and, having already capture< 
Riga, were advancirg toward Petrograd. By October 19, 
rumours were heard :jthat the Government, because of the threa , 
was making plans to move to Moscow. This, plus the tales 
of disaster told by deserting soldiers, created a scene of' 
confusion in Petr-ograd that deprived the Government of most 
of' its' control of' the city, Fortunately, due to the pressuie 
of the Western front, the Germans, on October 26, halted 
their advance and withdrew to Riga. 
It was· obvious to all by now that the Provisional 
Government had no control, and little inf'luenee, over the 
direction of military affairs. What direct influence the 
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Soviet had had was now counteracted by the existence of 
many new regiments whose members·, :thostly from the distant 
rural areas, and unaffected by the revolution, were loyal 
to their conservative commanders. The latter were suspiciou 
of the Provisional Government and failed to respond to its' 
directives. 
While Kerensky was forced to devote most of his 
·r 
time to the army, and the threatened German invasion of 
Petrograd, the economic situation continued to worsen, and 
without his personal leadership the Cabinet members, up to 
October 19, were unable to even agree on a basis for a 
course of action. After that date it was already too late. 
During this period a~l proposed actions to reorganize the 
economy were blocked by endless debate and argument. The 
same was true tn the Provisional Council where the contend 
groups refused to concede on any points. 
In the meantime, many workers, spurred on by the 
Bolshevik agitation, began claiming that the Government 
had proven itself ineffective in dealing with the economy, 
and went on strim for higher wages. On October 7, all 
railway workers went on strike, ~~ng up the shipment of 
all civilian goods while permitting only the military and 
munitions trains to run.l3. They were soon followed by the 
13 New York Times, October 7, 1917. 
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paper workers or Petrograd, and the Baku oil workers.l4 
After that, strikes spread throughout western Russia as the 
workers walked orr the jobs because or wage disputes, 
Bolshevik agitation, or just in sympathy with other 
By October 31, the situation had become so bad that Ke 
was forced, in an appeal to the Allies, to declare that, 
without a great deal or material aid rrom them, Russia 
would be unable to continue in the war.l5 Before any help 
could come, however, the Bolsheviks succeeded in overthrow-
ing the Government. 
The third, and most telling ~actor in the railure of 
the Third Coalition Government, and the Provisional Govern-
ment as well, was the rapid growth in strength by the Bol-
sheviks at this time~ This paved th~ way ror their success 
:ful uprising against the Government. 
I 
It has already been seen that as a result or the 
Kornilov revolt many of the moderates socialists, especiall 
among the workers, began to echo the Bolshevik demand ror 
the transrer or all power to the Soviet. Where rormerly 
they had been insignificant in Soviet afrairs, the Bolshevi 
were able to must~r almost enough votes at the Democratic 
Congress to block the formation or this last coalition 
14 Ibid., 0 ctober 9, 1917. 
15 Ibid., November 1, 1917. 
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with the liberal-bourgeoisie. Them on October 8, in a 
manner reminiscent of Brussels in 1913, they were able to 
get control of the Petrograd Soviet in an election, and 
Trotsky was named chairman.l6 During this period Lenin re-
mained in hiding in Finland, but was fu:.constant contact 
with the new chairman of. the Soviet. 
From October 8~ umtil the German threat disappeared~ 
Trotsky devoted his efforts to consolidating the Party's 
position, and strengthening the Red Guards.l7 The well 
disciplined Bolshevik-led group;· , with its growing armed 
force, was soon to be the strongest single political 
organization in western Russia, and as the internal condi-
tions continued to become more confused, their relative 
strength developed at a rapid pace. 
The first indication of what was to come was seen 
in the withdrawal of formal Soviet support of the Provision-
al Government. This happened on Octobe~ 8, after Trotsky 
was elected.l8 Then, after leaving the Provisional Council 
16 Of the ~ore than 2000 delegates to the Soviet only 
400 were present for the eJ:ection, and 230 voted for the 
Bolsheviks. See New York :times, October 13, 1917. ,, __
17 The Red Guards, formed in September to help defend 
the Government ag~inst Kornilov, had not been disbanded, and 
then, at the ·call for armed defenders of Petrograd against 
the Germans, the Guards were further expanded and strengthen 
ed. All during this period they were under the direct lead-
ership of Trotsky. 
18 Riech, No. 226, October 8, 1917, translated and 
cited by F. A. Golder, ~· cit.,.:p. 584. 
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on October 22, Trotsky declared tha:'t this had been done 
••• to make it clear that only a government of the 
Soviets can raise the slogan of peace, and to announce 
it to the democracies of other countries over the heads 
of the imperialists.l9 · 
By October 31, it was clear to almost all that the 
Bolsheviks were arming to attack the Government, because 
on that date the Central" Executive Committee: of the Soviet 
ordered all factory committees to prohibit the shipment 
of munitions to 8!1Y one without its perrnission.20 The 
moderate socialists, seeing that the workers now backed the 
Bolsheviks, agreed to this course of action without vigorous 
objection. 
In the m~antime the Government, helpless to do any-
thing, just remained as it had been, impotent and inactive. 
Many of the Minista?s, fearing the suspected revolt,spent 
considerable time providing for an adequate escape. The 
rumours at first indicated an uprising on November 2, but 
nothing happened. Thinking that the delay was due to the 
Bolshevik weakness Kerensky tried to assemble some troops f 
the defense of the Government. This attempt was defeated 
by Trotsky's order to the troops to disobey all orders by 
the Provisional Government, unless otherwise certified by t 
Soviet. 
19 Izvestiia, No. 193, October 23, 1917, Ibid., P• 
2o Izvestiia, No. 200, October 31, 1917, Ibid., p. 6 
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On November 7 ,_.with Kerensky at the .front, the 
Provisional Government received an ultimatum .from the 
Petrograd Soviet. The Ministers were given twenty minutes 
in which to surrender. They re.fused, and the Bolsheviks 
attacked. By early morning on November 8, the Winter Palace 
was taken, and the members o.f the Government were arrested. 
That afternoon Trotsky announced that "· •• the Provisional 
Government no longer exists.tt2l 
This actually marked the end o.f the Provisional 
Government although the Bolsheviks, for the two months 
that followed, claimed that they were only temporarily in 
control, and promised that the Constituent Assembly would 
be called. The Jatter was convened on January 18, 1918, 
but was immediately dispersed by the armed Bolsheviks who 
then proceeded to establish a dictatorship •. The Russian 
experiment w:itli:;democracy had .failed. 
21 Izvestiia, No. 207, November 8, 1917, Ibid., p. 
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CIHAPTER VI 
~ C DN IDIHJS ill .ON 
In the preceding chapters I have tried to present 
an accurate eval~tion or the sit~tion in Russia during 
the period rrom March 12 to November 8, 1917. It was my 
purpose to show why the Provisional Government was unable 
to compete with the social rorces that came into play 
following the March revolution, and why the inability of its 
members to agree upon a definite course of action constit-
uted the fundamental reason for its failure. Although there 
were many other factors involved I believe that the evidence 
presented supports my contention that the Government's own 
weakness was by far the most important. Therefore in an 
erfort to define more specifically the reasons for the 
railure of the Provisional Government I would like to first 
consider the nature of the Government's weakness, and then 
show how it contributed to the Bolshevik successe 
The nature of the Government's weakness lay in the 
fact that the socialist and liberal-bourgeoisie leaders 
had been unable to reach any agreement on a positive 
program ror dealing with the situation that conrronted them. 
This had been due to their failure to comprehend the 
nature or the revo lu ti on that had taken pJa c e.. For as , 
was seen, both had considered the March revolution as being 
poli~ical when in fact it was social and economic as well. 
And because of this both were willing to wage a battle for 
the political control of the country while letting all 
other considerations be delayed. 
Perhaps the most curious aspect of that failure to 
comprehend the totality of that situation was the fact that 
both the socialists and the liberal-bourgeoisie were 
guided by principles derived primarily from the same source, 
that being the nature of the historical development of the 
West European democracies. For the liberal-bourgeoisie 
this was seen in their adherence to the principles of 
Western Liberalism, and the belief that Russia's development 
was running parallel to that of the West except for the 
fact that she waa about two hundred years behind in the 
process. For, so far as they were concerned,this was 
the counterpart to the political revolutions that had 
resulted in the English and French monarchs' loss of power, 
and they considered themselves the counterparts of the 
western liberal-bourgeoisie whathad led in those revolts. 
Because of this the Russian liberals had insisted upon 
the creation of a liberal-bourgeoisie government , and the 
retention of the monarchy • 
For the socialists the relati~nahip to the democrati 
development in the West had come about through their 
adherence to the Marxian theory on the political development 
of nations. For according to their interpretation of !bJ:ie 
theory, which was based primarily upon the experience of 
113 
the western liberal-bourgeois democracies, they also 
considered the March re~olution as being exclusively 
political in nature. And,according to the theory, it was 
their duty to support the establishment o~ a liberal-
bourgeois government in e~change ~or the rfught to organize 
the workers,and agitate ~or improved conditions. This 
was made clear not only in their actions , but also in the 
reasons given ~or the re~usal to participate in the ~irst 
government. FaD it was made known at that time that they 
had declined the invitation because o~ their ideological 
considerations. 
Although the situation in Russia was somewhat 
similar to the revolutions that had occurred in the West 
it should have been clear to both the socialists and the 
liberal-bourgeoisie that the other elements in the situation 
did not co~orm to the ~ormer 1 s basic condition. For,as 
was seen,the Russian liberal-bourgeoisie had not led the 
revolt against the Tsarist regime, and they were not the 
strongest political group in the country. Despite this, 
however, both insisted upon the establishment o~ a liberal 
government with the apparent hope that the situation would 
con~orm to their ideas upon the situation. And because 
o~ this both ~elt ~ree to carry on the struggle ~or politic 
supremacy while letting the condition o~ the country 
deteriorate to the point where the success o~ the Bolsheviks 
became a clear possibility. 
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The rundamental importance or the railure by the 
socialists and the liberal-bourgeoisie to readily discern 
the nature or the situation can be seen in the errect that 
it had upon their attempts to deal with the three major 
problems·or the period, i.e., the war errort, the disrupted 
condition or the economy, and the question or land rerorm. 
as was seen it was the railure to ror.mulate any positive 
policies in dealing with each or hhese problems that 
provided the Bolsheviks with the opportunity to increase 
their rollowing in September, and prepare ror the later 
revolution. 
In respect to the war errort the socialists provid-
ed the major obstacle to the rormulation or an adequate 
policy when, in March, they issued the ramous trorder Number 
One", which relaxed military discipline and made impossible 
all attempts to reorganize the army, and then insisted 
upon the rejection or the secret agreements made between 
the rormer Tsarist government and the Allies. One result 
this was the crisis in May in which Paul Miliukov, the 
Cadet leader,resigned his post as Foreign Minister, and 
whioh resulted in the rorma tion or the rirst coalition 
government. From that period on the socialists and the 
liberal-bourgeoisie carried on their debate over this 
question both within the cabinet and ~n pQblic, and the 
bitterness with which it was waged pusked the two groups 
rarther apart. 
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A second result of the failure to agree upon a 
policy for ',.the continuation of the war was the inc~eased 
..... 
pressure by the Allies for a new Russian offensive, which, 
despite the low morale of the soldiers and the short supply 
of weapons and food, was undertaken. ~e failure of the 
offensive brought additional problems to the leaders of 
both groups because it resulted in the loss of all further 
aid from the Allies, and also helped stimulate the growth 
of public dissatisfaction with the Government. 
In respect to the disrupted condition of the ecu.u.uruV!J 
the political struggle also prevented the formulation of 
an adequate progr~. The socialists, trying to gain all 
possible benefits for the workers, blocked all proposals 
by the liberal-bpurgeoisie, while the latter in turn, 
depending upon the support of the indus trialis.ts and 
landowners, blocked the socialist 1 s measures. Because of 
this the condtion of the economy continued to worsen,and 
it provided a second source from which the public's 
restiveness developed. 
A second aspect of the failure to deal with the 
economic situation was the inability to provide a 
solution to the problem of land reform. For centuries 
this had plagued the successive governments and now, 
with a weak central government the paasants were taking 
advantage of their opportunity. Neither the nationalizat 
program of the socialists nor the private property scheme 
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the libe'Fal;_bb"urgeoisle::· appealed" to:' them·;: ana.:~ becausetbf 
the" Go*'~rrunent~r:k: :ina'!YilJ.~iti>t;b<::~'<iot;:~~y.-e!!a§.ilgfab~u:te4t;sl;he 
:j}:&as(~nt~nb~~gan:-.t~u:se:l~ the land, and they continued to 
refuse to send foodstuffs to market. Both the socialists 
and the liberal-bourgeoisie refused to take the first step 
in trying to bring about some settlement and they decided 
to let the matter rest until the Constituent Assembly met. 
This proved to be an unwise chaise because the continued 
violence in the rural areas and the shortage of food 
also helped in the growth of public restiveness. 
In September, because of the obvfuous inability 
of the Government to deal with these problems General 
Kornilov mgde his attempt to ~eize power. Although it 
failed its effect was enough to turn public opiniom sharply 
to the left and permit the Bolsheviks to increase their 
fol~owing, and prepare for the November revolution. That 
.f.. 
the latter were primarily dependent upon this situation 
can be seen in the fact that their demands £or the 
cessation of the war, the public ownership of the factories, 
and the division of all land among the peasants had had 
little effect npon the people for the first six months of t 
period, and that it. had only come about after the Governmen 
hltd'-1proved itself incapable of dea::J,.ing with the situation. 
Therefore it seems entirely probable that had the leaders 
of the socialist and liberal-bpurgeoisie been able to 
reach some agreement for a positive program the Bolshevik's 
ll$ 
success in November would nou have come about. 
To be sure the c9nrlict between the two groups 
did not constitute the sole reason ror the ra·ilure. There 
were many other ractors involved, some or which were also 
or importance, However, in view or the central posit~nnoor 
the Government, and the efrect that its actions had upon 
course of events, I do believe that the evidence does 
support my contention that the failure did depend upon the 
struggle for powe~ between the socialists and the liberal-
bourgeoisie which prevented the formulation of a derinite 
course of action, and permitted the Bolshevik 1 s growth in 
strength. 
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